


 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [Post [292711976](#)]

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MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense

Fri Jun 11, 2004 02:45
69.43.13.1

I believe that Mr. St. John has just identified the Mastermind of the operation of Sept. 11th! READ THIS ARTICLE AGAIN!
http://disc.server.com/discussion.cgi?id=149495;article=57214;show_parent=1

"In the context of 9/11 it also needs to be pointed out that Rabbi Dov Zakheim was Chief Executive Officer of System Planning Corporation's International Division until President George W. Bush appointed him Undersecretary of Defense and Comptroller of the Pentagon. Not long before Rabbi Zakheim rose to power over the Pentagon's labyrinthine, bottomless accounts, he co-authored an article entitled "Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century" which was published by The Project for a New American Century in September 2000, exactly a year before 9/11; in this article, on page 51, it is stated that "the process of transformation, even if it brings revolutionary change, is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor"! Voila! 9/11!"

Anyone else done any research on this stealthy, never-mentioned "undersecretary of defense" (authority) and controller of the Pentagon (funding/power)? TIME TO PUT THIS NAME AT THE FORE OF CHIEF SUSPECTS---and, without apology, here is a obviously Jewish/Zionist (Rothchild agent) man of authority, with the remote-control expertise (CEO of System Planning Corporation--aircraft remote control tech!), with authority just under Rumsfeld, the PNAC policy WRITER (talk about central


figure!), and the power of shifting funds within the Pentagon itself! This suspect shows Motive, Means, and Opportunity...all in ONE MAN! I believe he could very well be THE MASTERMIND OF 9/11! (Amazing how he is never mentioned in press either).

POST ANYTHING ON THIS MAN!! Time to indict, not an Arab, but a Jew!

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06/12/04 04:46 AM

 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [NewsWatcher](#) | Post [292712028](#), reply to [292711976](#)]
(Score: 1)

I had no trouble finding info about this "never-mentioned" Undersecretary of Defense. He was a principal *financial* officer of the DOD, responsible for rooting out fraud in defense contracts. He was sworn in on May 4, 2001 and he resigned effective April 15, 2004. When he wrote that 2000 essay you quote he was not in the govt but serving as a campaign advisor to Gov George W. Bush.

What I cannot find is any evidence that he is rabbi, or a Zionist, or connected with the Rothschilds.

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What I cannot find is any evidence that he is rabbi, or a Zionist, or connected with the Rothschilds.

Dov Zakheim is an ordained rabbi. See [YESHIVAT SHA'ALVIM](#). However, I haven't seen any supporting evidence connecting Zakheim to the Rothschilds or any evidence he was involved in the 9/11 attack. His earlier speculations about the effect of another Pearl Harbor, while they might provide a motive, don't constitute evidence of involvement in the 9/11 attack.


"American-Jewish organizations are, in 2004, no more democratic than the Communist Party was in the late Soviet Union" - Maxim Ghilan

Edited by ThreeOfSeven on 06/12/04 05:34 AM.

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"American-Jewish organizations are, in 2004, no more democratic than the Communist Party was in the late Soviet Union" - Maxim Ghilan

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Stop flagging me.


["Alan Dershowitz \(is\) perhaps the greatest living attorney and advocate of civil liberties in the U.S."](#)
— Alama the libertarian

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 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense**  [To: [NewsWatcher](#) | Post [292712386](#), reply to [292711976](#)]
(Score: 2)

Zakheim was capable of diverting Pentagon money to pay the Israeli high tech contractors who did 9/11 using demolition and remote control. This must have cost billions for contractors.

Did he?

Mainstream journalism has let us down. It's up to us--the new internet journalists--to dig up the truth and spread it around.

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 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense**  [To: [cyte](#) | Post [292712400](#), reply to [292712386](#)] (Score: 1)

This is getting progressively pathological. Zakheim is primarily a financial figure, but also an ordained rabbi and from a rabbinic family; somehow people don't think this makes him unlikely to have committed what must have been multiple crimes of the most serious nature.

More to the point, there's no evidence connecting Zakheim with remote control flying; as a financial officer he probably had very little to do with technology of that sort - if that technology exists at all. The DOD bio of him identifies SPC International (System Planning Corp) as a "political, military and economic consulting" firm; I haven't found evidence that SPC possesses the ability to remotely control aircraft.

On the basis of nearly nothing - except a distinguished career - he is being accused of enormous crimes which somehow

have escaped detection.

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06/12/04 05:38 PM



 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense**  [To: [NewsWatcher](#) | Post [292712633](#), reply to [292711976](#)]
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"POST ANYTHING ON THIS MAN!! Time to indict, not an Arab, but a Jew!"

Get it right NW.

Dov Z Not any old Jew, but a Zionist Jew!

US Congress & Senate Not any old Christian, but a Zionist Christian body!

Israel "right or wrong" is wrong.

ZionISm the problem.

Our love of zion is the problem.

We are the problem.

We MUST be fair as Americans.

A MAJOR paradigm shift is needed.

A kinder gentler fairer foreign policy is desperately needed.

Regime change in Washington is needed.

It may seem like mission impossible but once we expose the real masterminds of 911 THE WORLD WILL KNWO who the real evil dewars are.

Just ask...

WHY DID THEY RUSH TO SEND THE DEBRIS OF WTC and the PENTAGON to the INDIAN SUBCONTINENT TO BE SCAVANGED BY INDIAN SCRAP DEALERS?

WHERE are the BLACK BOXES found in the pentagon rubble on 9/14? WHAT IS SO SECRET WE CANT HEAR THE RECORDINGS?

WHERE ARE THE VIDEO FOOTAGE OF THE 19 HIJACKERS?

(they showd us one video clip of atta and his sidekick right?? where the hell are the other "17 hijackers" videos?


"Within a quarter of a century Americans will either have become violently antizionist or they will be devoured by Zionists" [NOSTRADOLFMUS](#)

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06/15/04 01:51 AM



 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [NewsWatcher](#) | Post [292716171](#), reply to [292711976](#)]
(Score: 2)

Under Secretary of Defense, Dov Zakheim

Fiscal 2005 Briefing

(Slides used in this briefing are available
at [http://www.defenselink.mil/News/Feb
2004/05brief.pdf](http://www.defenselink.mil/News/Feb2004/05brief.pdf))

The information below,
originally provided on background, is now
attributable to the Under Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) Dov Zakheim.

Briefer: We're doing this
again. Same ground rules as always. In
addition to what you just heard, just
interrupt me. If you can avoid using my
name that would be nice. At least one guy,
one person each time forgets that, but I

know who I am, you know who I am, so no need for it.

Next slide.

There you see the top line. The reason we got to seven percent is because we're working off of that number. The 6.1 rescission is all booked against FY04. Now in fact we haven't taken it all out of '04. For instance. \$3.5 billion has come out of the '03 Iraq Freedom Fund. That's a two-year fund, so we took money out of that one.

In addition you've got \$800 million that is coming out of other prior year rescissions, \$192 in procurement, \$28 in RDT&E, \$333 MilCon, \$164 in family housing, \$105 in the National Defense Sealift Fund which is a revolving fund.

\$1.8 billion in rescissions in '04, over and above the \$4.3 that I've just talked about. Now that came out of the '04 appropriation. What they allow us to do is take it out of either '04 funds, '02 funds or '03 funds. We don't have to make that final, final decision until the middle of August, roughly. We have to take the money out by September 30th. We're supposed to inform them 30 days ahead of time so that brings us to the end of August. So obviously decisions have to be made in August.

Again, it's booked against '04 so that's where you get your \$26 billion delta and your seven percent increase.

Next slide, please.

Here we're talking about outlays. Before we were just talking about

budget authority. Why are the outlays down here? Well, this is what we've actually spent in '04 or expect to spend, \$433 billion in '04. If you add our supplemental to the baseline budget we're at about \$440 billion, with the actual expenditures about \$433. And so when you count the supplemental in, there's no supplemental in '05. I know you're going to ask me all about it. There's no supplemental in '04 for '05 is what I was about to say. So right now this is the delta, 3.6 percent with a slight drop from the previous year.

Next slide, please.

Again, an outlay slide. Here we are as a percentage of the federal budget. If you want to look at, and again the drop is the same drop because of the supplemental in '04.

If you want to look at discretionary spending, because the defense budget is part of discretionary spending, we're at 47 percent. However, I would draw your attention to the fact that somewhere in the region of \$27 to \$30 billion depending on how you count it, is discretionary in name only because that's the medical accrual account which is about \$10 billion; it's the defense health program which is upwards of \$17 billion. That's not discretionary. The accrual account, for instance, is decided by actuaries. I get a letter from them, they tell me this is what I've got to put away, this is what we put away. I don't call that discretionary.

Nevertheless, the entire budget is considered discretionary and we're 47 percent of the total discretionary spending.

Next slide, please, by title.

Again, I left the supplemental
out so I wouldn't distort a comparison
between '04 and '05 -- keep it apples to
apples.

A few footnotes, these
footnotes simply show you where the
rescissions bite. So for instance O&M, the
Iraq Freedom Fund comes out of the O&M
account and that rescission. Here we don't
know where it's going to go so we put it in
others. Then we've got prior-year program
rescissions. So in terms of measuring
apples to apples, it doesn't really show at
all except in terms of the actual number
itself.

Again, you'll probably have
questions about this particular change. How

come procurement's gone down? To steal my thunder from a later slide, we have funded two ships this year that in the past would have been funded under the SCN account, the Shipbuilding Conversion Navy account. We have funded them in the R&D accounts. Those two ships are the Littoral Combat Ship which is a revolutionary ship, the first non-blue-water, it's not really a brown-water ship, for those of you who are Navy buffs, but it's a non-blue-water ship, the first of its kind, probably in 40-odd years if not longer. That ship as well as the new DDX, together if they were fully funded would be about \$2 billion. That would mean that the procurement number in practice is higher.

Now the impact on the shipyards is non-existent. In other words you'll have the same level of effort in the shipyards with the same levels of employment and all

the rest of it, as you would have if you had fully funded it. This is a budgetary mechanism. It is not a real life impact on how the ships are being built.

RDT&E is up. MilCon, and I'll talk a bit more about this later. If you take that number which is pretty close to where Congress enacted it. Very often we come in lower than the enacted, significantly lower than the enacted figure for the previous year. You add that to the privatization program which gets you about \$8 to \$10 for every U.S. government dollar invested. You add that to the sustainment program to keep the facilities up to snuff which is also increased, and you see that we actually have an extremely healthy military construction and family housing program, and family housing has gone up. I'll talk a little bit more about that later.

Let's move along. By service

here you are.

Why is there this disparity?

There are two reasons. Between the Air Force, and Navy/Marine Corps and the Army.

The first one is the Army's more manpower intensive, person-power intensive, whatever term you want to use. Personnel intensive. That hasn't changed.

The Air Force in particular has a lot of pass-throughs, as does the defense-wide account. A lot of intelligence money and space-related money goes into those accounts and literally passes through.

Finally, some of the more evolutionary things that are happening

aren't necessarily fully reflected in terms of dollars. I'll talk a bit more about it. General Schoomaker's totally new concept of how to restructure the Army tooth and also the fleet response plan of the Navy which increases the operational availability on very short notice of our major fleet units, particularly carrier battle groups. I'll talk to both of those in a little while. And those aren't really dollar driven, per se. They have dollar implications but that's not where the major changes are really taking place.

You've been reading, you've been writing about what the Army's doing. I would argue that what the Navy is doing is equally as revolutionary and what the Air Force has done, well they already started that in the '90s. So they had their kind of revolution with their expeditionary forces a few years ago, and the Special forces, as

you know, Special Operating Forces, that started a couple of years back. We are still with them better aligning particularly the Marine Corps with the Special Forces, moving some of the Special Forces missions into the general purpose forces. So again, you've got a major change there and I'll talk to that a little later.

Those all are not really -- the dollar implications are second order, maybe that's the way to put it.

Next slide, please.

Q: This \$9.6 billion increase to the Air Force, you're attributing mostly to intel and space?

Briefer: Not mostly, but a significant proportion. Obviously I can't give you the intel dollars. All I can tell

you is there's a chunk of change in there.
You can ask my colleague, Steve Cambone.
He'll tell you there's a chunk of change in
there, ask my colleague. [Laughter] Whoever
you're speaking to. Ask my colleague, the
unnamed official. [Laughter]

The themes. I think these are
pretty self-evident. One of the interesting
things about Bullet 4 and Bullet 1.
MacGregor [Douglas A. Macgregor], who is
clearly now widely recognized as a
brilliant thinker and an iconoclast,
Colonel McGregor has just written a new
book. It's called 'Transformation Under
Fire.' That really goes to these two
points. We are under fire. We are still in
a war on terrorism. And I'll get to the
details about how we're dealing with that
momentarily, but that is bullet number one.
We're in a war.

Then everything else has to
account for that situation, that we are
still in a war.

Next slide, please.

So what are we doing about it?

It's pretty self-evident there. Readiness
requirements including the operation and
maintenance funding.

Immediate needs. Force
protection is a program that is of extreme
urgency. We have been moving funds around
in the '04 budget to provide the skirts for
our HUMVEEs, to provide the protection for
individuals, to get better sensors, and
this continues it. This is a direct result
of the war on terror. Also there's UAV's.

Future acquisition up there
tells you exactly, laser satellites and so

on. I'll get to those too. We'll talk a little bit about the legislative authorities momentarily, and the intelligence, what you read is what you're going to hear.

Next slide, please.

Nothing really dramatic and new in this slide except that once again we're meeting our goals.

Now let me talk a little bit about the Army tank miles. Here you have an example of why we need to rethink the way we do readiness reporting. There's always been this question in the analytical community, ready for what? In other words, give me output measures. Don't give me input measures. That doesn't mean you don't want to have input measures. For instance, let's take the tank miles.

On the one hand you can say
look, General Schoomaker is moving the Army
in a completely new way and those units are
going to be lighter. Well, how relevant are
tank miles? On the other hand, what goes
into the measurement of tank miles? Not
just training at the home station, but
training at the National Training Center
which is the most advanced center of its
kind in the world. It also includes
simulation training which is a reflection
of whatever developments we've made in
computer and information technology. So you
can't just say well this isn't a relevant
metric. What you can say is this may not be
the only metric, but since this is the
metric we've got, until we work this out,
and the reporting system goes to the
question of whether you use C ratings or
not as well. C1, C2, C3, C4.

In the meantime, these are the measures we've got and we're meeting the requirement. That's the important measure.

On the system itself, the DRRS [DoD Readiness Reporting System], it's going to get \$25 million to support implementation. It's going to begin running this September. We're going to have a phased implementation over the next three years. And as I say, what we're really looking for are output measures. Ready for what?

Let me talk a little bit about this. As I said earlier, when you're thinking about family housing, when you think about military construction, you can't just think about new construction. You also have to think about sustainment.

Ninety-five percent is

important in several ways. First, it's higher than last year. We were at 94 percent. Second, it's across the board. All the services are sustaining at 95 percent. Third, it's approaching the level where you pretty much have set aside as much money as you need. Now could it be 96 percent, could it be 96.5 percent? Maybe. That's one of the reasons we have to keep improving our measures and metrics. Because what does this do? What this does is set aside money for anticipated maintenance that will begin 11 months from now and end 23 months from now, so you're projecting what you think is going to break down and how much it's going to cost to fix. Obviously you have scheduled maintenance and that's what governs this. But in practice, in addition to scheduled maintenance you're going to have unscheduled maintenance. So the real question is are we close enough? Is there a better, more refined way of deciding

whether it's '95, '96 or '97 percent? We're awfully close to 100 percent. So we've got a pretty good answer here.

Next slide, please.

Legislative authorities, I mentioned, it showed up in the slide earlier. We have been fortunate that the Congress gave us some authority to train and equip the Afghan National Army and the new Iraqi Army. We're trying to broaden that authority in two directions. One is with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan to include not just the military forces but the security forces. In other words, in Iraq the Civil Defense Corps, the Facilities Protection Service, the Customs folks, the border police. Why? Because basically the Army is set up, as all armies are, to defend against external threats. Guess what? Between us and our allies there

are what, 150,000 or more troops in Iraq right now. They're not worried about an external threat. The real question is internal security.

We have currently a couple of hundred thousand Iraqis -- the largest, by the way, force in Iraq -- under arms mostly in these various units. We want to train them and equip them properly. They provide the best sense of security and stability to their neighbors, they provide the best sources of intelligence to us. So we're trying to broaden that authority to take care not just of the Army, but of security forces, and to do the same in Afghanistan.

Q: -- that \$500 million compared to the current fiscal year including supplemental?

Briefer: The current fiscal

year was \$150, wasn't it?

Q: Including the supplemental?

Briefer: Yes. It's a real jump.

Q: How does it break down
between Iraq and Afghanistan?

Briefer: My guess is that the
majority, as in the case of what we're
doing with CERP [Commanders Emergency
Response Program] this year, I'll get to
that, we'll go to Iraq. A significant
proportion will go to Iraq. We haven't
broken it down yet.

Then you see we've also got
part two, which is friendly nearby regional
nations. This is one, we go to Congress
each year, Congress says we don't want to
do it.

We originally wanted it worldwide, Congress said no. Be more specific. We said, fine, nearby nations. There are a whole bunch of countries near Iraq and Afghanistan that could use this train and equip support.

Remember, what am I talking about? I'm talking about authority which means that it's money that's going to come out of the defense budget as opposed to money that's being added to the defense budget. I would have to reprogram to do this, which if I can steal my own thunder, creates a different problem for me because the Congress in its wisdom will only let me move three-quarters of a percent of my budget around. When you think about that, since I'm also -- let me put it this way.

If you are managing cash in any

kind of enterprise you recognize two things. One, the budget's only an estimate; and two, your responsibility is to make the best use of the cash that you can.

If you can only move three-quarters of a percent of what you estimate a year and a half ahead of time, you're going to need, you're in really serious difficulties.

Now when we go and we ask Congress to reprogram funds, we go and we tell them in advance and they can always say no. Any committee, all the committees that are involved can say no and it stops. So it's not a question of not informing them. But to make these programs really work, you add them up you see it's \$1 billion right there, \$800 million involved in pure reprogramming. That's a drawdown, a slightly different situation. You're using

up your transfer authority. ON a \$400 billion budget right now we're working off of \$2.5 billion in transfer authority. That's a serious problem for us.

I'll get back to that later, but this is an excellent example of why we need additional transfer authority.

The CERP, the emergency response program. This is the single most successful program we've got in Iraq right now. For an average cost of \$7,000 per project. We eliminate the middleman, we contract with locals. These are neighborhood projects. These are the things like if you're on a city council what you do all day. You deal with sewers, you deal with health, you deal with sanitation, you deal with telecommunications. If you've got farmers in your district you deal with irrigation. You deal with civic cleanup.

You deal with cultural stuff. That's what this deals with.

This is the best way we tell the Iraqi people we're not here to occupy you, we're here to provide you with enough stability so you can get on your own feet and run your own country. No games being played, no hidden card tricks. Nothing.

Q: So why is DoD doing this and not USAID?

Briefer: Because these projects are being done quickly. USAID deals with big projects. It deals with projects that take a lot of time with RFPs and so on. They have a whole procedure.

You want to move something quickly, you want to get a street cleaned up tomorrow, AID is not functionally

capable of doing that. That's not what they do. You've got a commander on the ground. He sees that a street needs cleaning up. He sees that the neighbors are getting real upset and the dogs are starting to bark and the women are starting to shout and the men are starting to grumble. All of a sudden the commander, he or she realizes if we don't clean this up, somebody may decide they want to go over to the other side. If you clean it up you make a lot of friends. You clean it up in six months it's going to take you longer to make friends. You clean it up in 24 hours, 48, 72, 96 hours, people go my God, these people are responsive to us.

Q: So what's the increase from '04 for those two accounts?

Briefer: Okay, that one I said was 150. This one we were at, it's kind of

complicated. We were at 340 but only 180 in appropriated funds. The reason is we took \$160 million of seized funds, that is to say the stuff that Saddam and his buddies tried to ferret out of the country or bury in sewer holes, and we used that to fund that program. And out of that, and this goes back to the question earlier about proportions, just to give you a sense. Out of that \$340 million, \$300 is going to Iraq, \$40 is going to Afghanistan.

Then the drawdown authority.

The 2003, I believe it was, Afghan Freedom Support Act, allowed us to draw down equipment to supply the Afghan National Army. It's worked out real well. The Afghan National Army, I don't know, those of you who may have been out to Afghanistan and seen these folks when they start out, these are guys, they start out they're crawling on the ground in simulated attacks, they're

being shot at, the helmet falls off,
everything stops. Got to pick up your
helmet. Oh, I forgot, I'm being shot at.
That's how they start out. By the time
they're finished they're a really well
organized, well trained, impressive force.
You see these folks, sometimes if you go
out to some of the towns where we have
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs, in
the outlying areas. Sometimes you'll see
this rag-tag band of the folks who are
working for the warlords. Then you see
these Afghan National Army folks, and it's
night and day. It's having an impression on
the locals. It's helping the central
government. And oh, by the way, even the
way they think is becoming much much more
professional. It's not just spit and polish
stuff.

You go and ask the sergeants
what they want. They don't say we want a

new tank or whatever, they say we want communications equipment. That's what this program is doing for us.

Next slide, please.

Q: You didn't give us [inaudible]. Did that not exist?

Briefer: As I said, it was \$180 million for CERP.

Q: That was for emergency response --

Briefer: Right, and the previous one was \$150 million.

Q: And the increased drawdown authority --

Briefer: We got \$300 million

two years ago, and we used \$150 million each. So now we're asking for \$200.

The SUPP. This is the '04 SUPP.

Obviously the biggest -- We think we're going to do fine. This money will carry us through fiscal '04. We're not asking for another SUPP. If we anticipate we're likely to have one but there will not be a request even if we're likely to have a need for one until calendar year '05. We would cash flow whatever we might need in the first quarter of '05.

You're going to say why are you doing that? It's very simple. I challenge anybody in this room to tell me what's going to happen in Iraq after July 1st. Boy, you can make a lot of money if you know.

Q: I know where you're going

with this because this is --

Briefer: I'm glad you do. Can I
finish for everybody else? [Laughter]

Q: I think people looking, it's
an election year, and with the deficit and
Iraq becoming huge issues, this is going to
look to perhaps people more cynical than I
that this is just an effort to sort of keep
a lid on the cost of Iraq until after the
election.

Briefer: No, and I'll tell you
why not.

I can give you three equally
plausible scenarios as to what will happen
in July of this year.

Scenario number one, the
handover is smooth. The United Nations

loves it. The French say we're ready to send troops in. [Laughter]

Q: Plausible?

Briefer: Hey, our French friends have said we want United Nations approval. The Germans have said United Nations approval. A lot of countries that voted in the Security Council said we want United Nations approval. What happens if the United Nations approves? I think it's plausible.

Scenario number two. Everything that was predicted that would happen when the war began and didn't happen -- mass migrations, mass interethnic killings and interdenominational killings, all happens. All of a sudden we have a greater demand on our forces. And by the way, the French don't come in.

Scenario number three. It goes reasonably well, the handover is reasonable, we have a plan to reduce our forces somewhat and we move along that track.

You tell me which one of those is going to happen.

Q: I can't tell you, but I think some people might suggest that the Pentagon knows it's going to need extra money for FY05 because the budget doesn't cover contingency operations. It only covers sort of normal day-to-day operations, so therefore some sort of marker might be laid so that Congress knows what it's getting into.

Briefer: Look, when we laid down a marker, and it was a very accurate

marker at the time -- In 2002 we went to \$
10 billion for Afghanistan, Operation
Enduring Freedom. Congress didn't give it
to us. It turned out our estimates were
pretty good.

This time we don't have a good
feel for those estimates.

Sure, we can project roughly
what a maximum level is likely to be, but
we don't want to go to the Congress and ask
for a maximum level and effectively say
well, it might be a lot less but you give
us more. Somehow I don't think that's going
to sit well. There is no way to predict,
number one.

Number two is, since everybody
knows full well that we can cash flow the
first quarter of the next fiscal year and
manage it, because whenever we're late with

a supplemental that's what we always have
to do anyway, what is the reason?

I would argue the other way
around. It's not why are we being cynical
about not asking for the money. I'm
wondering whether people are thinking
clearly enough when they ask that we should
come up with it now?

Q: If it did take so long for
the supplemental to pass wouldn't it be
prudent to start it earlier than early next
year?

Briefer: Not necessarily. If we
sent it up with the budget or around that
time it would be quite different. If
everybody knew it was coming around then,
it would be quite different. It's a matter
of working closely with the Congress on
this. I think it's perfectly plausible to

be able to make this thing happen properly,
and I don't think the Congress would hold
off.

Q: With the first anniversary
of the war coming up in March how much did
the buildup and the war combat phase
actually cost? After all the dust settles.
And how much has the occupation cost from
April 1st to January 1st, roughly, so we'll
have apples and apples there.

Briefer: We're still working
those numbers. I can give you sort of an
average sense and then I'll give you a
sense of why it's hard to give you a
precise answer.

We said, and we reestimated,
but basically we were hovering around the
\$4 billion mark in just about all our
estimates. Even the very first estimate

that was given to the Foreign Relations Committee which had a lower number, left out the reserves. And if you brought the reserves in there it came to about \$4 billion.

We've seen in the last couple of months reporting, and the reporting runs two months late, so already I can't answer your question directly. But the October report showed something in the region of \$4.5 billion. The September report showed something in the region of \$3.7 billion.

Why the disparity?

Well if you remember, before we got the supplemental and until really January of last year we did not have a special account for those operations. We were forward (cash flowing), forward financing those. Well, when you forward finance you obviously have to pay it back

so since the war we've in effect been paying back, it was about \$30 billion as I recall, and we've been paying that back. The monthly figures reflect that so there's been that fluctuation. In September we simply apparently paid somewhat less back than we did in October. There's going to be another bump-up and that will be when the troops, when we have the rotation that's going to take place. When you're going to have this massive rotation you're going to have transportation costs. So it's very hard for me to predict at this stage what the total cost will be, except I can say that as we're getting closer and closer to paying off what we had originally cash-flowed, you're going to see the numbers coming down.

Q: In cost accounting in the buildup you must have a somewhat solid figure there.

Briefer: That's the best that
I've got right now. Do you have any number?
I don't think we have anything right now.
We can get something. We'll try to generate
something.

It's because of this
complication that makes it kind of --

Q: -- the building and the
actual conflict, that will be a year in
March. You don't have the solid figures yet
for that?

Briefer: Again, because, how do
you want to attribute the cost of the
conflict? Do you want to just do the month
or so or the six weeks or so of the
conflict itself?

Q: The buildup and the

conflict.

Briefer: Okay, but again, if you talk about the buildup and the conflict, what about things that you actually spent on that you continue to use after the conflict, for example? You buy ammunition. You're going to use it -- you bought it in the buildup, you use some of it in the conflict, and then you use some more after the conflict. It's not simple.

Q: Just to get back to her question a minute ago, how is what you're doing different in terms of --

Briefer: You can mention her name.

Q: She's not unnamed. Her question about the supplemental. How is what you're doing different from what past

Administrations always did and that this Administration said you wouldn't do, which is to have supplementals to pay ongoing expenses?

Briefer: Sure. The very simple answer is because I was the one that said it in some locations, not necessarily this one so you won't know who I am and what location, but as you recall the statement was made that we would only fund wartime supplementals. This would be a wartime supplemental. It's as simple as that. We have not done anything other than fund costs related to the war. And we have been very scrupulous about this. OMB has been very scrupulous about this. We have worked jointly with them to make sure that unless there was a direct relationship to the various operations -- Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Noble Eagle -- it didn't show up in the supplemental. And quite

honestly, I can tell you that that disappointed the expectations of some folks in this department who were used to just what you were talking about and thought this was going to be a way to pick up some monies they would have liked but for whatever reason didn't get. They've been disappointed.

Next slide, please.

Q: Can I have one last question on that?

Briefer: Yeah.

Q: If as you say the supplement comes along with the next budget.

Briefer: Roughly.

Q: Sometime next year, early

next calendar year.

Briefer: It's hard for me to give you a predicted date at this time.

Q: But if that were to come along with the next budget cycle, and taking into account the kind of deficit that might be part of it at that time, do you think that's going to put an enormous burden on the '06 budget?

Briefer: I don't think so.

Look, you have to go back to where the outlays are relative to the overall budget and relative to GDP and you're making certain assumptions. You're making assumptions about revenues. You're making assumptions about economic growth. It seems to me that you won't find two economists that will agree on those things. They congenitally don't agree. That's why they

become economists.

Therefore, you give me a set of assumptions and I'll give you an answer on the impact on the deficit. The President has said he wants to cut the deficit in half over five years. That's based on a set of assumptions. Those assumptions come true, a supplemental's not going to be a problem. Anybody else? Can we move on?

Q: That says you don't anticipate another supplemental in the current fiscal year.

Briefer: In the calendar year.

Q: But I think you've said you definitely will not --

Briefer: I know I'm not a president, but presidents aren't the only

people who never say never. As we stand
here now, I don't anticipate it. If
something happens on December 31st at 11:49
at night, what are you going to tell me?
I'm trying to give you an honest answer.

As I see it now, there isn't
going to be one. Anticipate is just a more
prudent way of saying what I said.

Q: Can I take one more crack at
-- I just want to make sure we understand.
If you're going to submit a supplemental
theoretically early next year around this
time, it will take a few weeks, you're
still going to have to be projecting your
costs through October.

Briefer: Sure.

Q: So why is it okay to project
that much but not another three months --

Briefer: Because I'd much rather be projecting costs sometime after July 1st when I have a pretty good idea of what's going on in Iraq than right now when I have no idea what's going to go on in Iraq.

Next slide, please.

Military personnel. What you see there is pretty straightforward. Let me just tell you, we keep seeing these reports about the Secretary having added 30,000 troops yesterday or the day before. That's not the way it's worked.

You have end strength which is what the Congress tells the department to have on the last day of the fiscal year in terms of people. Then you have emergency authorities which allows the Secretary to

get more people called up to go on active duty. That's called actual strength. That's where we are.

We need to understand that end strength is not necessarily relevant to an emergency situation which we are now in. That's why the actual is actual. For some reason that constantly gets misunderstood.

The budgeted levels do not include supplementals and reserve mobilization.

Fiscal year '03 ended \$44,000 above, and this is the January 1st number. It's going to fluctuate.

Let me give you some more points before I move slides. We've obviously kept our word here. Several years ago we said we were going to go down. It

was 18 percent in fiscal year '01, out of pocket expenses. That makes a significant difference to people who have to spend money out who don't necessarily have the highest incomes. Now it's gone down to zero as we promised.

Recruiting and retention results are still very very good. There are some weaknesses in some states in the Army Guard and we're looking into that. But Guard attrition rates are historically low right now, less than 20 percent. They might go up some. We're doing pretty well.

Again, employment cost index plus a half percent, we believe that we are continuing to meet our obligations to our people.

Next slide, please.

You'll note it says managing demand. It doesn't say reducing stress or anything like that.

The basic point is this. You've got a force that is about, as you just saw, nearly 1.4 million active. You've got 887,000 selective reserve. Yet we keep hearing about problems maintaining 120,000-odd in Iraq. That's not a stress problem, that's a management problem. So we're doing a number of things to deal with it and I'll talk about these on this slide and the next.

Expanding capabilities is straightforward. We're restructuring our forces between active and reserve. The next slide will show that.

New ways to achieve flexibility to retain military professional skills. We're going to need congressional help on

that to really realize this initiative properly.

Temporary authorities. What we have done in the past and continue to do is use Stop Loss. That's how the numbers go up. Now you're not going entirely eliminate Stop Loss because Stop Loss as it's properly intended is to ensure that just as a unit's about to deploy John or Jane Doe doesn't raise his or her hand and say "Whoops, I'm ready to go, goodbye. I'm gone." That doesn't do much for unit cohesion. So you're going to have Stop Loss.

The question is are you going to use Stop Loss in the kind of large, widespread way we're using it today? The answer is we don't want to. We're going to do something about that. That goes again to the new proposals of General Schoomaker.

Military/civilian conversion.

This is actually ongoing already. I'll give you a case in point.

The DFAS, the Finance and Accounting system which is under the Comptroller had several hundred, approximately 300 uniformed Air Force personnel as part of its personnel chart. The Comptroller and the Secretary of the Air Force worked out an arrangement where all those folks moved back to the Air Force. Because we have the new National Security Personnel System which Congress enacted last year and this year we're going to start to implement to the tune of affecting about 300,000 people ultimately. We will be able to hire civilians more quickly to replace those several hundred Air Force folks. We will not have to hire them on a one-for-one basis. So we will be much more efficient on the civilian side.

Fewer people to do the job that
more people were doing before.

Meantime, all of a sudden
you've got several hundred people back in
the Air Force who can be retrained or
recycled if they retire and others come in,
to do missions that civilians can't do.
This is going on right now in Fort
Leavenworth as well, by the way. They're
retraining, in terms of just retraining
itself, the Army is retraining people to
the military police function. That's
another part of this. As we move to the
next slide I'll talk about that.

First I want to talk about
reducing the need for a really involuntary
reserve mobilization. Somebody volunteers,
that's fine in the first 15 days. But you
don't want to call people up in the first

15 days if they don't want to go, so we want to reduce that.

We want to limit involuntary reserve mobilization generally. We don't want people to be serving more than one year every six. Now in fact, there's been a lot of misconceptions about the use of reserves and the fact that reserves are constantly redeploying and so on. In fact if you go back to the Haiti operation, that's right after the Gulf War, 13.5 years, give or take, to now, and you look at how many people have deployed more than once, including perhaps more than once in OEF or OIF, it's about three percent of the reserves. That's it. Again, you've got this kind of imbalance here.

Remember that great phrase, low density/high demand? This is what this is. It's low density/high demand for people.

So you've got certain folks --
military police, transportation, civil
affairs, medical -- tremendous high demand,
low density. Not enough of them.

So what the Army's doing is
phasing out artillery, air defense and
other units, moving folks into these kinds
of terribly needed positions. And they're
doing the training right now. They've
started.

You can see the number of
positions that are being affected -- rather
a large number.

Again, let me emphasize, this
isn't just something for the future. This
says you can see fiscal year '03, '04, this
is ongoing. It's something we've started.

Next slide, please.

For those of you who are not familiar with all the dates on BRAC -- Base Realignment and Closure -- here they come. Get your pencils out.

No later than February 16, 2004, final selection criteria are published and transmitted to the Congress. Submitted with the budget itself is our force structure plan and our inventory of military installations. No later than the Ides of March -- those of you who don't remember Shakespeare, that's the 15th -- nominations for the BRAC Commission to the Senate. No later than the 16th of May, this is all this year, Secretary of Defense recommendations are transmitted for closure and realignment. No later than September 8, that goes to the Commission. The Commission transmits to the President their

recommendations. No later than September 23rd, the President approves or disapproves, an up or down decision, the recommendations move on to the Commission. Then Congress has 45 legislative days, that's not consecutive days, it's legislative days, to disapprove the recommendations in a joint resolution. If they don't disapprove -- double negative. If they don't do anything, these recommendations become law. So this is BRAC year.

The other --

Q: 2005.

Briefer: Yeah, 2005. The only thing that happens in 2004 are two things. February 16th this year and the '05 budget. The Ides of March is 2005. Stay tuned. Is that clear?

Q: Yes.

Briefer: Did I confuse anybody?

No? Good. I cannot give you anything like that kind of precision for the second part.

We have started talking to folks since the middle of 2002. When I say folks, I mean other countries. Here you're talking about an overall shifting of our global posture. There are going to be countries that we might pull all our forces out of. There are going to be countries that we might pull some of our forces out of. There are going to be countries that we might not pull any forces out of. Then there will be other countries that we're going to move forces into. Maybe as forward operating locations, maybe as collocated operating bases, maybe as classic bases the

way we're familiar with them. Those countries are a huge, broad spectrum. For instance, they include some countries in the former Soviet Bloc -- anything east of Germany today. So we've got a lot of different countries, a lot of different situations, a lot of different types of facilities that we might be thinking about. These all involve delicate negotiations. No way we can predict cost savings or anything else except to tell you it's ongoing.

I have to point out that as a result of the congressional restrictions against what's been called in the parlance BRAC-proofing -- [Laughter]. That is to say you cannot tip your hand regarding your intentions for any particular facility until the Commission has done its work. It will mean that some forces that might have come back to Iraq and gone somewhere in the United States because they weren't going to

stay overseas, because we were going to close facilities overseas, will now have to stay overseas somewhere, say Germany, whatever, because we can't tip our hands as to where they will go.

So you do have some kind of interconnection between the posture review and the footprint issue and BRAC. BRAC does kind of make it difficult to move your forces directly to where they ought to go if you don't want them to be overseas. We'll have to sort through that.

Next slide, please.

Q: On that, you mentioned about resources and not really being able to project. Obviously that's the case. But when, is it fair to say, that the global posture review is finished, and do you wait for that to be finished to finish the BRAC?

Briefer: I think we'll have to wait until the posture review is finished. We're going to consult with the Congress on that. We'll make our changes in conjunction with the '05 BRAC so that I would have thought, correct me if I'm wrong, that the first time we'll really have a good feel for that is '06. I don't know if you could do it sooner than '06 in terms of the global posture and the costs related to it.

Staffer: FY06. The two are intertwined and they're going to have to --

Briefer: That's right.

Q: --be worked and balanced together.

Briefer: You can't do them separately, is the point.

Q: So this isn't really so much a budget issue is what you're saying.

Briefer: Right, but we want people to know where we're going, and we want people to know that there's a connection to the BRAC and the BRAC is calendar year '05, FY05.

Q: Another BRAC question. You used the phrase BRAC-proofing. Each of the last few years there have been a number of members through the MilCon budget and otherwise who have done add-ons for the express purpose of trying to BRAC-proof their bases, to make their bases more attractive. Is the department going to be any more active this year, any more outspoken about opposing those kinds of add-ons?

Briefer: I think the first question is we'll have to look at whether the add-ons really are BRAC-proofing, and that's one for the lawyers. So we begin with the lawyers, and once they tell us in their wisdom what it is that's going on, then we'll probably be able to react to it. But as you can imagine, this is a highly technical issue. You've got to really see whether money that's being put into a particular facility can be justified under all circumstances or not.

If a roof collapses you're not going to say well I'm not going to fix that roof because it's BRAC-proofing. But the problem is of course that many of the kinds of issues you're talking about are not as cut and dried as that one. So our first step would be our legal counsel.

Q: If you want to remove troops

back from Germany now or in the near future, why do you have to wait until '06 to do this? Can't you move them to a place and then decide later if they need to move yet again?

Briefer: No. I used Germany just as an example because we have troops there, so if you're moving them from Iraq, I mean in theory they could go anywhere. You could move them to Paris but I don't think we have a base there right now.

So I was just using that as an example. The real point is this. If you move them to some facility in the United States aren't you by definition saying this facility is so important that you can't consider it for BRAC. That's the problem.

Q: But one could argue that Fort Bragg is so important, because it's

got troops there now.

Briefer: But all facilities have something going on now. That's what the realignment and closure is about. You look at what you have now.

The Secretary of Defense has made very clear that we have in excess of 20 percent more facilities than we need. But everything's being used. That's why this process is so complex, because one could in theory justify the use of any facility. I believe it was the late Senator John Tower who said everybody supports base closures in somebody else's district. [Laughter] So that's why we have the process we have. That's why you cannot simply move somebody to a given facility because you are in effect -- even if you aren't intentionally tipping your hand, people will interpret it as tipping your hand.

Q: Are you prohibited by law
from doing this, or is it a policy
decision?

Briefer: No, the law says you
should not --

Q: Should not or could not?

Briefer: you should not.
Therefore the lawyers have to tell you
whether you would be violating the law if
you moved.

Q: How about military
construction funds then? I mean that tips
your hand too.

Briefer: The same
considerations. We're being very careful
about that for the same reason. You're not

going to stop all military construction
because you have people who have to live
and work in decent facilities. The question
is how do you do that? How do you do that
within the framework of the law? We've been
very careful about how we're putting our
proposals together.

Q: Is it 20 percent excess
facilities or 20 percent excess capacity?

Briefer: Capacity. Excuse me. I
stand corrected. You're right.

Q: Does that affect your
rotation plan?

Briefer: It affects our ability
to deploy people back from places that we
--

Q: [inaudible]

Briefer: It makes it harder.

Q: How is rotating in '05 different than rotating in '04 if you're fighting a war? I mean the global war on terrorism --

Briefer: The real issue is this. When you're going to bring people home, are you going to bring them directly home or are you going to bring them to some place overseas? If you are going to -- ideally if you had already decided you were going to reduce a presence in a given country, then you would really want to bring them directly home from Iraq. It's not that you can't rotate. It's that if you have people that are scheduled to come back home and you're not going to add to the number of people at a given facility or anything like that, it's going to be as

usual, that's fine. The question is, suppose I wanted to instead of having force in Country X and I was going to move those forces in Iraq to Country X where they would be, I really wanted them not to go to Country X. I wanted them to come back to the United States. I can't do that. That's what I'm saying.

Q: Do you have a ballpark figure of how much money you could save if you were able to do that, bring them back?

Briefer: I don't have one on the tip of my tongue. Except that we expect there will be some savings, by definition.

If you're going to start closing down facilities overseas, you're going to save money.

Q: Just to clarify, we're not

--

Briefer: By the way, my colleagues can correct me if I've got this wrong. I don't think I do. But jump in, please.

Q: We're not likely to see the global posture review recommendations until what point in the BRAC procedure?

Briefer: All I'm saying is they have to be worked out in the context of BRAC procedures. You've got this whole other issue of negotiating agreements with other countries. When the other countries reach agreements with you, they're not worrying about your BRAC procedures.

I'm simply saying there are these two factors that affect how this is going to happen. One is the pace of

negotiations, the other is BRAC. They're linked for us. They're not linked for the other countries.

Q: I understand that. Is there any way that -- At what point will the department make it public what they would like to do in --

Briefer: I think the first thing the department would have to do, and I would really probably prefer that you address this to my brothers and sisters in policy, but it seems to me that the first thing the department would have to do is know where these people are going to or coming from. In other words you'd have to have a sense of what countries are prepared either to take or release forces.

I've got about 20 minutes. If you would like I'll move on. If you want me

to just continue to answer questions, then
we'll stop when I stop.

All right. Missile Defense
Agency.

About a \$1.5 billion more this
year. And that has two parts to it. \$900
mill

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Rabbi Dov Zakheim (Jacob-Heim) it is. Excellent find NW! This links perfectly to the entire story, because who else had the authority to ground the airforce when the commercial airplanes were flying in?

As it happened with Pearl Harbor (to throw the US into WW2), we have 9-11 to help the United States start a WW3. It reminds me as to how Germany was attacked in order to be pushed to begin WW2 in the first place.

Zio-Jews on the work. But of course, like Germany, they don't intend to make the United States a world leader... but to destroy it. All these wars are done in order to weaken the US military so that it becomes ripe for slaughter.

"Wise is not the one that knows many, but the one that knows usefull", Diogenes
"Great desires create great needs", Democritus

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Precicely!



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China acts as an external supervisor and orchestrator... because they just can't "blend in" in that area you know! The Japanese military made its appearance in Iraq (Japanese military??? I thought that after WW2 the US was Japan's military!...) but after understanding the stupidity they did, they vanished! (typical...)

China as field operatives must stay out of it, except the appearance of several agents under the "journalist" profession... which seems to be very common. As it comes to further infiltration (terrorist groups, governments, military, population), the only ones that can fit amongst Semites, are Semite Zio-Jews. But the high orders do come from China. The others are handled in the supreme Zionist Lodge ±AOA of London (which is the one issuing the orders to the US government).

"Wise is not the one that knows many, but the one that knows usefull", Diogenes
"Great desires create great needs", Democritus

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But in short... it does help the resistance in most cases. China has formed a sort of unofficial alliance with Islam (soon to be as official as with Russia).

"Wise is not the one that knows many, but the one that knows usefull", Diogenes
"Great desires create great needs", Democritus

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Time to indict, not an Arab, but a Jew!

That'll be the day.

The media will always mislead, use your mind.

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TIME TO PUT THIS NAME AT THE FORE OF CHIEF SUSPECTS---and, without apology, here is a obviously Jewish/Zionist (Rothchild agent) man of authority, with the remote-control expertise (CEO of System Planning Corporation--aircraft remote control tech!)

I'm willing to bet there are more than a few former soldiers and sailors who'd be happy to put legs to this story ... if they only HAD legs. Thanks to Dov and his Hawks, they no longer do.


Give me control of a nation's money and I care not who makes the laws. - Mayer Amschel Bauer (Rothschild)

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07/06/04 10:49 AM



 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [RidinShotgun](#) | Post [292761617](#), reply to [292761599](#)]
(Score: 1)

THE BODY COUNT: Bush Administration Fall-Out



<http://www.missouri.edu/~quinnl/news/bodies.html>

"NEVER AGAIN" (unless you are Palestinian)

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 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [Kudzu](#) | Post [292761629](#), reply to [292761617](#)] (Score: 2)

Watch it!! They're gonna gitcha for S&M snuff porno. Nevermind that its so appropriate for what they've done.

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07/06/04 11:15 AM

 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [Alama](#) | Post [292761650](#), reply to [292761624](#)] (Score: 2)

You really have lost it, you know that?

No, you have. Did I say anything about Dov being a Jew? No. I didn't have to. You read that right into what I said ... because you KNOW he got caught doing what zionist Jews do best and that scares the crap out of you.

Its that old collective guilt thingy that you folks are so famous for promoting and it comes back to haunt you every time one of your own gets outed.

You have taught us too well for your own good.

Give me control of a nation's money and I care not who makes the laws. - Mayer Amschel Bauer (Rothschild)

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 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [Alama](#) | Post [292761660](#), reply to [292761654](#)] (Score: 2)

I didn't write the heading. I didn't ordain Dov. I didn't select him for this high office. I am not responsible for his misdeeds.

I merely said this story should get legs because too many of our sons and daughters lost theirs due to the immoral acts of 'Dov and his Hawks'.

You would dispute this fact? If this story is true, should it be silenced BECAUSE he is a Jew? Should he not be punished?

Give me control of a nation's money and I care not who makes the laws. - Mayer Amschel Bauer (Rothschild)

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07/06/04 11:40 AM

 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [Alama](#) | Post [292761687](#), reply to [292761678](#)] (Score: 2)

I'm sure you'd be screeching your lungs out if a Christian Minister got thousands of young IDF soldiers killed and maimed for life.

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07/06/04 11:49 AM

 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [Alama](#) | Post [292761709](#), reply to [292761696](#)] (Score: 2)

When it happens, my hypocritical friend, let me know.

It probably never will happen. That is the primary difference between Zionist Jews and everyone else.

your already sullied reputation

I didn't know this was a popularity contest

Give me control of a nation's money and I care not who makes the laws. - Mayer Amschel Bauer (Rothschild)

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07/06/04 12:03 PM

 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [Alama](#) | Post [292761739](#), reply to [292761725](#)] (Score: 2)

If it were I would not be one of the most "unpopular" posters here.

ROFL! Well, at least your sense of humor is intact!

a den of vipers

Uh oh. You are taking Andrew Jackson's name in vain. Oh, and I do think he plagurized that line from someone else

[*scratching my head, pondering who that might've been*].


Give me control of a nation's money and I care not who makes the laws. - Mayer Amschel Bauer (Rothschild)

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07/06/04 12:14 PM




 **MASTERMIND OF 9/11! Rabbi Dov Zakheim: Under-sec of Defense** [To: [NewsWatcher](#) | Post [292761752](#), reply to [292711976](#)] (Score: 2)

Very good article. I haven't heard of this guy before. Could he be one of the string pullers behind the scenes?

"The best guide to the future is an understanding and a study of the past. When history is distorted, then any kind of rational, wise policies for the future become impossible." Mark Weber

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